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The aim of this paper is to establish some basic guidelines to help draft the information 
letter sent to individual contributors should it be decided to use this model in the Spanish 
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1.-Introduction 
 Pensions, according to Jackson (2005) and Larsson et al (2008), are complex 
agreements with compulsory participation (purchase) in many cases and characteristics 
which make it difficult to provide clear and concise information to the contributor. They 
are long-term contracts with contributions made throughout the working lifetime, although 
the retirement benefits are obtained much later: “money in the future for money paid 
now”. In some cases affiliates contribute in order to gain entitlement to benefits they may 
or may not need, e.g. disability, or that other people would receive, e.g. survivor. In some 
pension systems these benefits may depend explicitly on long-term demographic and 
economic factors such as earnings growth, life expectancy, inflation, returns on assets, 
productivity and other factors that are hard to predict, and it is difficult for contributors to 
understand how they may be affected by them. For many individuals, pension wealth and 
protection against certain risks is their most important asset, but it is not often perceived 
that way.   
 Retirement provisions in many countries may come from different pillars: compulsory 
public defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) plans, compulsory or voluntary 
private company schemes that may also be DB or DC, and individual pension plans. 
Having information about the public system alone may not be enough for someone with 
more pension plans, and therefore individual pension information can become very 
complex. 
 There is empirical evidence - Mitchell (1988) and Lusardi & Mitchell (2006 and 
2007a) among others - that individuals in general know very little about the characteristics 
of benefit systems and what key variables may affect the amount of their final pension. 
Individual pension information is therefore needed to enable them to make the right 
decisions regarding consumption, savings and risk cover. Various authors such as Lusardi 
& Mitchell (2006), Lusardi & Mitchell (2007b), Fajnzylber et al (2009) and Biggs (2010) 
show that having a certain amount of financial knowledge and adequate planning can have 
a positive effect on saving and retirement decisions. There is also evidence - Sunden (2009) 
- that having knowledge about benefits affects retirement age. Workers who underestimate 
their pensions, for example, are less likely to take early retirement than those who 
overestimate them.  
 One of the reasons why people do not usually have financial knowledge is the 
difficulty involved in learning about pensions. The process of retiring or becoming disabled 
happens only once, so people cannot learn from their mistakes. In many cases this involves 
a psychological cost. In addition, affiliates generally do not appreciate the benefits of 
having information about pensions because they expect the public pension system to 
provide them with enough benefit.  
 Pension information is aimed at increasing the knowledge contributors have about 
the contributions they make, the expected benefits and the degree of cover they have for 
the various risks to which they are exposed during their work. One important objective is 
to motivate affiliates to think about their retirement and the risks they are exposed to in 
order to make them analyse the effect that the various actions they take in the course of 
their lives could have on their estimated amount of pension. This information could lead 
them to take decisions based on the need to make more effort (savings) in order to have a 
high enough level of consumption during their retirement and improve their cover of 
certain risks. 
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 Individual pension information can be defined as all the details that need to be 
provided to individuals to enable them to adequately plan their retirement and cover the 
risks mainly associated with disability and death. As Larsson et al (2008) have pointed out, 
it is worth noting that many countries significantly improved the information they supplied 
or started to supply it as part of their pension system reform. 
 The existence of personalized information like the orange envelope in Sweden, the 
blue envelope in France, the yellow in Germany and what is known as the “Social Security 
Statement” in the United States, apart from giving accounting information and an estimate 
of the benefits and risks covered, can also provide information about the pension system 
itself and how it works. It would be useful to have this kind of information especially if the 
system were to undergo any type of reform or immediately after it was carried out. 
 As far as Spain is concerned, given the dearth of information about pensions that 
contributors receive, the uncertainty as to the financial health of the public pension system, 
the recent reform that has just come about1 and the fact that many pensioners rely on the 
public pension as their only income after retirement, it is essential that the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) should seriously consider the possibility of introducing a periodic 
information model similar to that sent out every year to affiliates by the SSAs in more 
advanced countries2
 After this brief introduction, the structure of the paper is as follows. Based on the 
pioneering work done by Jackson (2005), Larsson et al. (2008) and Sunden (2009) and the 
experiences of the most advanced countries in this field, Section 2 conceptualizes what is 
understood by “individual pension information” and looks at its most relevant 
characteristics. Section 3 analyses reports of certain countries and describes two models in 
detail - the United States and Sweden - concentrating on their structure, aspects that could 
be improved and their limitations. Section 4 includes a number of recommendations of 
particular interest for designing the Spanish model. The paper ends with bibliographical 
references and two appendices containing the individual statements for both the United 
States and Sweden. 
. This is the justification for the basic aim of this paper: the 
establishment of some basic guidelines to help draft the information letter sent to 
individual contributors should it be decided to use this model in the Spanish public pension 
system.  
                                                 
1 At the draft bill stage as of April 2011. The changes are important ones and substantially alter retirement 
pension expectations for young and middle-aged contributors. The legal retirement age will rise progressively 
from today's age 65 to age 67. This will be applied over a transitory period between 2013 and 2027, and in 
order to receive 100% pension it will be necessary to have contributed 37 years as opposed to the current 35. 
A 100% pension will be possible at age 65 with 38.5 years contributions rather than today's 35. Early 
retirement will be possible from age 63 with 33 years contributions or at age 61 in times of economic crisis. 
There will be better incentives for extending one's working lifetime, the period for calculating the qualifying 
base will increase from 15 to 25 years, and the percentage of the full pension received by a worker will be 
proportional to the numbers of years contributed, starting at 50% for 15 years working up to 100% for 37 
years working. By comparison, before the reform the system was biased in favour of shorter careers. Finally, a 
so-called sustainability factor will be introduced from 2027 based on the evolution of life expectancy for 67-
year-olds. 
2 The FIPROS 2010/27 project “General and individual information on the Spanish social security system: 
proposals for improvements”. 
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2.- Individual pension information  
 As mentioned in the introduction, individual pension information can be defined as 
all the necessary details that the participant/contributor/pensioner needs to receive from 
the system/plan to which they are currently affiliated - basically contributions made, 
probable amount of pension entitlement, replacement rate, retirement choices, accrued or 
consolidated rights, etc. - to enable them to adequately plan their retirement period and 
cover the risks mainly associated with disability and death. 
 Following Larsson et al. (2008) and Sunden (2009), there would basically be three 
levels of individual pension information: 
a) “Accounting information” is the most basic level and involves the fundamental elements 
that affect acquired rights (retirement, disability, survival), i.e. contributions, amount of 
contributions, length of time contributed, contribution bases, etc. This type of information 
helps make contributors aware that the amount of their future pension depends to a large 
extent on the amount of the contributions made. It conveys the idea that retirement 
pensions are like savings and that contributors should think about whether they have 
adequate cover for certain risks.  
 In defined contribution (DC) pension systems such as those in Sweden, Chile and 
Singapore, this is achieved by showing the individual balance which describes the evolution 
of the financial or notional capital by giving details of movements for the period (year), 
basically the difference between the amounts at the start and end of the period. In defined 
benefit (DB) systems such as those in the United States and Japan, however, this is done 
using the contribution record for the complete working lifetime up to the date the 
information is issued.  
 This information level helps make the pension system more transparent. However, 
although the information given is necessary information, it is not generally sufficient.  
b) “Action/course of event information” is information given to the contributor to 
quantify how different actions they may take (contribute more, take early retirement, etc.) 
or future events that may come about (increase in longevity, lower than expected economic 
growth, lower than expected financial returns) could affect their estimated amount of 
benefit.  
 The main question that arises at this information level is how to show the amount of 
benefit: 
1) In a DB system the provisions or benefits are determined by a formula that combines 
the level of contributions with the years worked. This formula expresses the part of the 
final salary or pensionable earnings to be replaced by the retirement pension as a 
replacement rate. In this type of system there is a great deal of implicit uncertainty 
deriving from the possibility that the authority governing the system may decide to 
carry out a reform for any number of reasons and reduce the contributors' accredited 
rights and/or the amount of the pensions in payment. The explicit uncertainty 
increases even in countries with DB systems because, according to Vidal-Meliá et al 
(2009 and 2010), there is a tendency to link pensions to the evolution of demographic 
parameters or what are known as ABMs (Automatic Balancing Mechanisms), such as 
those in Portugal, Finland, Germany and recently introduced in Spain.  
2) In a DC system the provisions or benefits basically depend on contributions made, the 
return on those contributions, and life expectancy at the time of retirement. At 
retirement age the accumulated amount (notional or real) is converted into either a 
lifetime annuity, programmed withdrawal or in some cases a combination of a lifetime 
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annuity plus an initial lump sum payment. The benefit amount is not defined in 
advance but depends on the aspects mentioned above, and for that reason the explicit 
uncertainty is greater.  
 Another question is how the expected benefits vary according to retirement age:   
1) In DB systems, both the normal retirement age, when retirement pension would be 
payable without any reduction, and the early retirement age, which would mean a 
reduction in benefit, are normally specified. The formula for calculating the pension 
provides information on how much of a reduction would be applied to the full pension 
in the case of early retirement. It is easy to understand at what age benefit will be paid 
and how much it will be, but it is not so easy to make the contributor understand that 
an increase in normal retirement age will mean a bigger reduction in the replacement 
rate at early retirement age.  
2) In DC systems it is only necessary to specify a minimum retirement age and not a 
normal retirement age. Converting the capitalization account into a monthly payment is 
not easy and that makes it even more complex to guess how the choice of retirement age 
will affect benefit. The conversion basically depends on life expectancy. Given a 
specific retirement age, for example, the initial annual benefit will decrease over time as 
life expectancy at that age increases.  
 A final question at this information level is how employment mobility can affect the 
amount of benefit: 
1) In a DB system mobility could have a negative effect on benefit as it is difficult to 
assess the balance or mathematical reserve and a number of years' affiliation are 
required for benefit entitlement. This could be solved by quantifying the balance and 
periodically informing the contributor of the present actuarial value of the accredited 
benefits, as proposed by Jackson (2005).  
2) In a DC system this problem does not exist since affiliates constantly have the value of 
their consolidated rights quantified and it is easy to integrate this amount into any other 
system with similar characteristics. 
c) “Uncertainty (risk) information”. Estimating future benefits is not easy even though 
details are given about how the estimate is made. Affiliates also need to be able to 
understand the information. If the forecast supplies just one result for the amount of future 
benefit, this may give an impression of certainty when in fact the final result is extremely 
uncertain, especially if the contributor is far from retirement. It would be useful to provide 
information explaining that the result given could be affected by financial imbalances in the 
system as a whole, which would be shown in the actuarial balance. It is this aspect, 
according to Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2011) that is the main link between general (the 
system's actuarial balance) and individual information. The connection between the two 
types of information is obvious. If the solvency or sustainability indicators deriving from 
the general information show an uncertain financial position, this is a sign telling 
contributors that they will have to increase their contributions in size or over time and/or 
the benefits will decrease in order to maintain the system's sustainability. 
 DC capitalization systems, such as that in Chile, make financial investments, and 
affiliates are therefore exposed to all the financial risk that this involves. For this reason the 
information should include enough details to enable them to quantify the risk their benefits 
carry. In any case, information should be given about so-called pension risk - Bernstein 
(2010) - using a density function for replacement rate probability which would include all 
the various risks the contributor faces, although it is only fair to point out that it is more 
than doubtful that the average contributor will be able to understand this information. 
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 In NDC notional account systems such as Sweden's, contributors take on a risk in so 
far as they do not know for certain what the internal rate of return (IRR) on contributions 
will be or what replacement rate will be achieved. According to Vidal-Meliá et al (2006) and 
Boado-Penas et al (2007), this risk can be qualified as non-diversifiable or systemic as it is 
directly associated with the overall risk of the economy. The risk affecting contributors is 
the economic risk (basically due to a reduction in the growth rate of GDP or salaries), 
which is also influenced by demographic risks (e.g. increased longevity, lower fertility, 
higher unemployment) that affect economic activity and the financial health of the pension 
system. 
 Most public pension models are based on pay-as-you-go and many countries face 
long-term deficits or serious solvency problems, which means they will have to carry out 
automatic or discretionary reforms to solve them. This in turn means they will either have 
to cut future benefit levels, increase the retirement age, raise the contribution rate or apply 
a combination of measures. It is very important to stress in the individual statements to 
contributors that their benefits are conditioned by two aspects: the individual, i.e. amount 
contributed, contribution history, retirement age, and the collective, i.e. the system's ability 
to meet its acquired obligations with contributors and pensioners. 
 It needs to be pointed out that the Social Security Administration in Spain only 
supplies annual information about contributions made, the aim being that the contributor 
should inform the SSA if they notice any discrepancy. In other words the individual 
information provided covers only a small part of the first level described above. 
3. - Experiences in some selected countries, with special reference to 
the US and Swedish models 
Personalized statements are a relatively recent phenomenon. Apart from Chile, which 
introduced a basic version in 1981 and a personalized pension forecast in 2005, it was not 
until the end of the 20th century and the early years of the 21st that most of the countries 
selected starting using them. Tables 1a and 1b summarize details of the most important 
characteristics of the individual statement in Sweden, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, the 
US, the UK, Japan and Canada. All the countries considered have personalized statements 
that are sent out to contributors every year. Generally speaking, this concern with keeping 
people informed individually about pensions is associated with the existence of reforms to 
the pension system either already carried out or about to be carried out.  
Most of the countries that appear in the tables have reformed their pension systems 
and one of the purposes of sending out these individual statements is to let people know 
about the reform and generate confidence in the new system. In almost all the countries 
there is a section in the statement that briefly describes the pension system. However, most 
of them give no information about the system's sustainability, the exceptions being the US 
and Germany.  
One of the general purposes of sending out individual information common to all 
countries is to provide details of contributions made and future benefits and pensions. The 
statements aim to make contributors aware that it is important to think about their 
retirement and about covering certain risks such as disability or death. They need to be 
aware of how certain decisions they take in the course of their lives may affect their 
benefits when they retire, and they need to have useful information when deciding whether 
to take up an additional form of savings to complement their retirement pension. A target 
common to all the countries, therefore, is to make the information transparent and 
accessible.  
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In general the statement provides information about contributions made up to that 
date in such a way that the information made available by the SSA can be compared with 
details held by the contributor. This would be the first level of information. However, the 
information differs between DC pension systems, DB systems and mixed systems. In a DC 
system, providing information about contributions is something that is obtained directly, 
whereas in DB systems the information is normally less transparent because the 
contributions and taxes may not have been made completely clear for each affiliate. In a 
number of countries such as Sweden, Finland, the US, Canada, Japan and France, the 
statement itself, apart from serving as a vehicle for comparing the details held by the SSA 
as regards contributions made or pensionable earnings, requires the affiliate to check the 
information and contact the SSA if they find any mistakes so that the discrepancy can be 
rectified. 
One important question concerns whether all affiliates should receive information or 
whether it should be directed exclusively to particular groups who need to be fully 
informed. A number of different approaches have been considered here. Age is one of the 
common factors for deciding who should receive the statement. Some countries exclude 
younger contributors when they send out individualized information because they are not 
thought to be overly concerned about retirement and still have very few contributions. 
Some SSAs such as Sweden's send a statement to anyone who has made a contribution; 
this is also the case in Canada and the UK. Some countries differentiate by age and gender, 
as is the case in the UK and Chile. Three groups are considered in Canada - the young, the 
middle-aged and those close to retirement age - but no distinction is made by gender. 
Statements in the US are sent out to people aged 25 or over, while in Finland they are sent 
to everyone from age 18. Japan used to send them to groups aged 35, 45 and 55, but since 
2009 the process has been generalized and statements are now received by all affiliates. 
Finally, in Germany the statement is sent from age 27 as long as the affiliate has at least 5 
years of contributions. 
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Table 1a: Characteristics of statements sent to contributors in certain countries with defined contribution or mixed systems 
Items Sweden Chile Germany UK 
Type of system DC  Notional account and capitalization 
DC 
Individual capitalization 
DB 
Points and capitalization 
DB 
Pay-as-you-go and capitalization 
Retirement age Flexible from age 61 60 for women 65 for men Age 63-67 
60-65 for women 
65-68 for men 
Sent to Anyone who has paid any contributions 
Different types of statement to: 
Women: 30-50; 51-59 
Men: 30-55; 55-64 
From age 27 to anyone with 5 years 
contributions 
Different types of statement to: 
Men: 20-49; 50-64 
Women: 20-49; 50-59 
Frequency Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly 
Year introduced 
1999 
Den Allmanna 
Pensionen 
1981-Cartola cuatrimestral 
2005-Proyección pensión 
personalizada 
2004 (trialled from 2001) 
Renteninformation 
1988 (on request) 
Automatic State Pension Forecasts 
(APF) 
Purpose of the statement 
 
 
1.-To increase contributors' and 
pensioners' interest in the pension 
system after the 1999 reform. 
2.-To help plan retirement now that 
responsibility lies with contributors 
and new variables such as life 
expectancy have an influence. 
 
To estimate the amount of pension 
affiliates would obtain when they 
become entitled (they can carry on 
working) and suggest ways of 
increasing it. 
1.-To inform people of the impact of 
the various reforms since 1992 and 
enable them to visualize whether 
additional savings are needed.  
2.-To compare personal information 
with that held by the ASS. 
To help contributors plan for their 
retirement and make them think 
about the increase in life expectancy, 
the amount needed in order to 
retire… 
Description of pension system Yes No Yes Yes 
 
Information about the system's 
sustainability  
(actuarial balance) 
 
No, although an actuarial balance is 
compiled every year. 
Not necessary. The defined 
contribution capitalization system is 
by definition sustainable. 
Yes, but no annual actuarial balance 
is compiled. Reference is made to 
what is termed the sustainability 
factor. 
No, although an actuarial balance is 
compiled every five years. 
 
Information about other benefits 
 
No No Yes. Disability. No 
 
 
How are the contributions 
incorporated into the statement? 
 
 
 
Total of previous balance + 
contributions made over the last year 
= accumulated total 
(See Appendix 2) 
Previous balance, list of monthly 
contributions after tax, current 
balance. 
Total contributions during working 
lifetime + employer's contributions + 
total contributions paid by third 
parties = total contributions from 
work. 
 
No 
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Table 1a: Characteristics of statements sent to contributors in certain countries with defined contribution or mixed systems (continued) 
Items Sweden Chile Germany UK 
Forecasts Forecast in real terms from age 28 Forecast in real terms from age 30 In real terms 
For two groups: under-50s and 50 
and over. Different for men and 
women. 
Hypothesis as to future 
pensionable earnings in the 
forecast 
Same as the last one, constant in real 
terms 
Various assumptions, average of the 
last 6 years but with various 
contribution densities 
Average of pensionable earnings for 
the last 5 years 
Same as the last one recorded when 
carrying out the forecast 
Is a “minimum pension” included 
in the forecast? Yes Yes No Yes 
Hypothesis as to interest rate 3.5% real annual 5% real annual rate of return Not applicable Not applicable 
Websites 
Cooperation between the state and 
insurance companies 
http://www.pensionsmyndigheten.se
/prognos 
 
www.minpension.se 
 
http://www.spensiones.cl/compendi
o/ 
577/w3-propertyvalue-4213.html 
 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/ 
Pensionsandretirementplanning 
/StatePension/StatePensionforecas 
t/DG_10014008 
 
  
10 
 
Table 1b: Characteristics of statements sent to contributors in certain countries with defined benefit or points systems 
Item Finland USA France Japan Canada 
Type of system DB Pay-as-you-go 
DB 
Pay-as-you-go 
DB 
Points 
DB 
Pay-as-you-go 
DB 
Pay-as-you-go 
Retirement age Age 62-68 Age 62-67 From age 60 Age 60/63 From age 60, changes between 2011 and 2016 
Sent to Ages 18 to 67 but not pensioners Workers over age 25 
Different types of statement 
to contributors aged  
35, 40, 45, 50, 55. 
Different types of statement 
to contributors 
1.-Under 50 
2.-50 and over 
Different types of statement 
to contributors 
1.-18-29 
2.-30-50 
3.-50-70  
 
Frequency Yearly Yearly 5-yearly, every 2 years on request Yearly Yearly 
Year introduced 2008 
1988-1989 (on request) 
1995 (60 and over) 
2000 (25 and over) 
Social Security 
Statement  
2007 
1.-Le relevé de situation 
individuelle 
2.-L'estimation indicative 
globale 
 
2009 
Nenkin Teiki bin 
1997 
Statement of contributions  
Purpose of the statement To check the information held by the SSA. 
1.-To help contributors plan 
for retirement and make them 
aware of how their disability 
or death could affect them 
(and their families). 
2.-To check whether the 
information held by the SSA 
regarding recorded 
contributions is accurate and 
complete. 
1.-To check the information 
held by the SSA. 
2.-To inform contributors of 
the rights they have already 
acquired and those they could 
acquire for their retirement if 
they continue working. 
1.-To give contributors basic 
information about the pension 
system following the 2004 
reform and an estimate of 
their benefits. 
2.-To increase the level of 
confidence in the public 
pension system and reduce 
people's concern.  
3.-To check whether the 
information held by the JSS 
regarding recorded 
contributions is accurate and 
complete. 
1.-To help contributors plan 
for retirement and make them 
aware of how their disability 
or death could affect them 
(and their families). 
2.-To check whether the 
information held by the CPP 
regarding recorded 
contributions is accurate and 
complete. 
Description of pension 
system Yes Yes Yes No Yes. In appendices. 
Information about the 
system's sustainability  
(actuarial balance) 
 
No, although an official 
actuarial balance is compiled 
every three years 
Yes. An official actuarial 
balance is compiled every year No 
No, although an official 
actuarial balance is compiled 
every five years 
No, although an official 
actuarial balance is compiled 
every three years 
Table 1b: Characteristics of statements sent to contributors in certain countries with defined benefit or points systems (continued) 
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Item Finland USA France Japan Canada 
Information about other 
benefits No Disability and survivor No No Disability and survivor 
How are the contributions 
incorporated into the 
statement? 
Not indicated Annual pensionable earnings  (see Appendix 1) 
Annual income and 
contributions obtained Pensionable earnings Year's contributions 
Forecasts Forecast in real terms from age 50 In real terms 
Forecast for those aged 55 of 
the amounts they will obtain at 
ages 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65, 
in euros per year 
In real terms In real terms 
 
Hypothesis as to future 
pensionable earnings in the 
forecast 
An average of pensionable 
earnings for the last 5 years. 
1% and 2% growth. 
Same as the last recorded 
when carrying out the forecast Same as the last 
Same as the last recorded 
when carrying out the forecast 
Average of the contribution 
bases of the entire working 
lifetime 
Is a “minimum pension” 
included in the forecast? No Yes Not applicable Not applicable Yes 
Hypothesis as to interest 
rate Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Websites 
www.etk.fi/Default.aspx?Lang
=2 
www.tyoelake.fi/Page.aspx?Se
ction=43800 
www.socialsecurity.gov/estima
tor 
www.socialsecurity.gov/applyf
orbenefits 
www.socialsecurity.gov/WEP 
www.socialsecurity.gov/GPO 
www.medicare.gov 
www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/
#Retirement 
http://www.info-
retraite.fr/index.php?id=gip 
 
http://www.sia.go.jp/top/kai
kaku/kiroku 
/teikibin/e/index.html 
 
http://www.servicecanada.gc.
ca/eng/isp/cpp/ 
soc/explain.shtml 
Source: Based on Usuki et al (2006), Försäkringskassan (2008), GIP (2007), Larsson et al. (2008), TPS (2009), Berstein et al. (2009),  Fajnzylber, et al (2009), SSAB (2009), 
Kalliomäki (2010), Sailer (2010), Couch & Smith (2010), SSA (2011), Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2011) and own based on various websites. 
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The usual way the statements are sent in all the countries considered is on paper via 
the postal system. In many cases the envelope is associated with a particular colour - orange 
in Sweden, for example, blue in France and yellow in Germany. Japan uses different 
colours depending on the purpose, while Finland uses white to make it stand out from 
advertising materials and give it a more formal touch. In the case of Sweden, much time 
was spent considering the advantages of using paper and sending the orange envelope out 
every year to affiliates rather than offering something they would access anonymously via 
the internet. These advantages can basically be summarized as follows: it has a special 
design and a colour with which it is associated and which identifies it; the information is 
concentrated once a year; the media refer to it, it attracts the attention and is mentioned 
whenever pensions are referred to; it has become a pension brand along the lines of any 
commercial brand; and banks and insurance companies use it in sales campaigns for their 
products. 
In most of the countries considered, the information supplied in the statement can 
be used in conjunction with online services provided through a number of websites. This 
information channel will increase in line with the more widespread use of internet and 
computer access in the future. The possibility of consulting additional personalized 
information is very interesting because it not only means that the information sent by post 
can be more basic and understood by most affiliates, but it also enables the statement to be 
enriched in a more personalized way. This is especially appropriate as regards the aspect of 
risk, which is something most of the statements deal with inadequately.  
Some of the countries considered with defined benefit systems, such as the USA, 
Japan, Canada and Finland, as well as having the general aims mentioned earlier like 
checking the information held by the SSA and helping to plan for retirement, also try to 
make contributors aware of how disability or death could affect them and their families. 
Information about this type of provision is only provided in statements in the USA, 
Canada and Germany, with the latter restricting itself to disability. 
Most of the statements show an estimate of future benefits in real terms. In countries 
with defined benefit systems, the formula used to calculate benefits normally specifies the 
level of provisions as a replacement rate, and contributors can therefore have a fair 
knowledge of their level of benefits if they know the general lines along which the pension 
system works. However, these formulas can be complicated and in many cases the 
retirement age is gradually being increased due to reforms to the pension system, such as in 
the USA, Canada and Germany, which complicates matters further.  
In defined contribution systems, information needs to be given about the benefits 
contributors might expect to receive given the contributions they have made. These future 
benefits can be affected by retirement age, life expectancy, economic risk, etc., especially if 
part of them comes from a real capitalization account. In Sweden and Chile, which both 
have defined contribution pension systems, the focus is mainly aimed at helping people 
plan for retirement, as responsibility is in the hands of the contributors, and providing an 
estimate of the amount of pension the affiliate would obtain. 
The individual statement in Sweden provides information about how future benefit 
would be affected depending on whether the affiliate retires at age 60, 65 or 70. The aim 
here is to make it clear that working longer will mean an increase in the estimated benefit. 
The annual individual statement in the USA provides an estimate of benefits at the normal 
retirement age of 67, age 62 (the earliest age at which one can retire), and also at age 70. 
Because the normal retirement age is gradually being increased, individuals receive an 
estimate for the normal retirement age for their generation, e.g. for those born in 1956 this 
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would be 65 years and 10 months. Hence everyone understands that the new normal age of 
retirement of 67 is gradually being introduced.  
Estimates of future benefits are offered to two groups in the UK, the under-50s and 
the over-50s. As far as the under-50s are concerned, the statement includes an additional 
set of questions to help affiliates regarding future employment, income, degree of cover 
from other pension plans and the possibilities of saving out of their current income. The 
statement for the over-50s focuses on planning for retirement and therefore tells affiliates 
about the need to set aside some of their savings for this period and also to consider 
possible expenses during retirement. The UK statement has less information about accrued 
rights and contributions than normally found in the countries analysed, but it does include 
practical advice on how the information provided should be used. It also includes a 
separate leaflet with more information on savings options, which is something other 
statements do not have. In France the information provided to contributors over 55 is an 
estimate of how much pension they will receive for the range of ages between 60 and 65. 
Affiliates in Chile who are over 10 years away from reaching legal pensionable age, 
i.e. women between 30 and 50 and men between 30 and 55, receive a personalized 
enclosure that estimates their pension according to two extreme scenarios: in the first, the 
person contributes every month until the legal retirement age and average earnings for the 
last six contributions are used for the estimate; in the second, the person stops contributing 
and retires at the legal age with the funds accumulated earlier. Affiliates who are less than 
10 years away from the legal pensionable age, i.e. women between 51 and 59 and men 
between 56 and 64, are given an enclosure explaining the advantages of postponing their 
retirement. One forecast is made for everybody in which the affiliate contributes half the 
months until reaching the legal retirement age and then applies for the pension at that age, 
and another in which he contributes half the months until 3 years after the legal retirement 
age (63 for women and 68 for men) and then applies for the pension. 
When estimating future benefits, the SSA has to make assumptions about future 
earned income, e.g. about growth in salaries and interest rates. In France, Sweden, the 
USA, the UK and Japan, the hypotheses regarding future pensionable earnings are all equal 
to the last one recorded before carrying out the forecast and constant in real terms. In 
Chile, Germany, Finland and Canada, different averages are calculated. In Chile, for 
example, an average is made of the last six years but with various contribution densities. In 
Finland and Germany they use an average of the tax base for the last 5 years and in Canada 
the average contribution base for the entire working lifetime. On carrying out the estimate, 
some countries include a minimum pension. This is the case with Sweden, Chile, the UK, 
the USA and Canada. In Chile and Sweden, where the system is based on full or partial 
capitalization, a real interest rate has to be considered for the forecast, this being 5% per 
annum in Chile and 3.5% per annum in Sweden, although no reference is made to the fact 
that the contributor has to carry a high level of risk because the actual interest rate could be 
lower. It could be said that the hypotheses used to estimate future pensions are in general 
over-optimistic and, especially where young contributors are concerned, tend to 
overestimate benefits. 
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 Given that the estimates represent possible future benefits, it is important that 
affiliates know how to interpret the amounts correctly. The best way to do this is to 
provide different scenarios to convey the idea that benefit can vary according to economic 
growth and life expectancy because the difference between the age the statement is 
received and the date of retirement makes the uncertainty increase. In general the 
personalized pension forecasts do not focus much on the different types of risk the 
contributor faces. It would be useful to introduce some kind of sensitivity analysis of the 
different variables and quantify their effect on the estimated pension. It is important to 
provide an accurate pension forecast, but it would also be interesting to incorporate some 
measure of variability and have a prediction interval with some kind of error margin, like 
any other statistical prediction. One problem that arises is that information of a higher 
quality may require a higher level of education to understand it correctly. It is therefore 
essential to design a basic document that can be complemented via other channels to 
provide more detailed information. 
 Now that the main characteristics of the statements in selected countries have been 
described, we will make a rather more detailed analysis of the statements in the United 
States, because it is a defined benefit pension system similar to some extent to the current 
Spanish system, and in Sweden, because this is the country that has led the way with this 
type of information and popularized it over the last few years, a benchmark or role model 
for many countries when they undertook the reform of their own pension systems. We will 
focus especially on structure, aspects that could be improved and limitations. 
3.l.- The “Social Security Statement” (SSS) in the USA 
This is a 4-page individual statement (see the example in Appendix 1) that the US 
Social Security Administration (SSA) sends out each year to every worker over 25. 
According to Couch and Smith (2010), the first statements were sent out to affiliates on 
request in 1989. In 1995 it was sent out automatically to all contributors over 60, and from 
2000 to everyone over 25. 
It has two basic purposes: to help people plan for their retirement and explain how 
contributors (and their families) could be affected by disability or death, and to check 
whether the information held by the SSA as regards recorded contributions is accurate and 
complete. Benefits paid by Social Security are directly conditional upon recorded 
contributions, with the best 35 years taken into consideration, and therefore the reliability 
of the estimates depends on this information being as complete as possible. 
The first page contains an introductory message explaining the importance and 
value of having a social security system. It points out that the SSA covers not only the 
retirement contingency but much more; it also covers disability and can provide benefits to 
the contributor's family in the event of death. It reminds workers that it is only one of the 
income sources that they should consider when planning for retirement, and that therefore 
other sources such as personal savings, investments and private or other types of pension 
plan should also be considered. To find out more about how to save and why, it refers 
recipients to a federal government website designed to show them basic aspects regarding 
how to manage their personal finances. Finally it contains a section which gives a future 
outlook warning of the possible financial difficulties facing the social security system and 
the need to solve them by reforming the system to make it viable. 
The second page provides an estimate of different types of benefit: retirement, 
disability and survivor in the event of the contributor's death. It also indicates whether the 
individual has worked enough to receive Medicare. There is a basic explanation about how 
the benefits have been calculated and the assumptions used, and then there are two 
paragraphs referring to the implications of two laws - the Windfall Elimination Provision 
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and the Government Pension Offset - either of which could reduce any benefits the 
individual might receive from Social Security, along with websites giving more detailed 
information about them both.   
The third page contains a table with personalized information showing the 
contributions paid to Social Security and Medicare for each year of the individual's working 
lifetime. It also shows the total contributions paid to Social Security by both the worker 
and the employer over the whole working lifetime. It then recommends that the details 
provided should be checked to make sure they are correct. If any mistake is found, this 
should be reported to the SSA via the Toll free number provided. 
Finally on the last page a number of matters are explained that should be taken into 
account regarding different Social Security programs and benefits that the individual or his 
family may be entitled to in terms of retirement, disability and death. It mentions what 
benefits may and may not be expected from Social Security and the advisability of having 
private insurance. 
Criticism and limitations of the SSS 
Ideally the SSS should reach everyone, but according to the SSA (2009) it contains 
too much information. Therefore the most important points such as the contribution 
record, estimates of future benefits and the normal age of retirement do not stand out 
clearly and obviously. 
The form the statement takes today is a “one size fits all” which has to be used for 
everyone. The information sent does not distinguish by age, income level or type of family. 
It is static, unchanging over time, and this can make it seem boring to the recipient, who 
might end up ignoring it completely without even reading the most important information. 
Finally, the language used is often difficult to understand, very dense, bureaucratic and 
confusing. This could lead the contributor to make the wrong decisions through 
misunderstanding the information.  
Benefit information is given in terms of monthly payments, no doubt to be 
consistent with the formulas the SSA uses to calculate them, according to Jackson (2005). 
But when the statement refers to income or earnings levels, this is done in terms of annual 
salary, i.e. twelve times higher than the monthly levels used before. This makes it more 
difficult for the recipient to calculate the replacement rate, i.e. the pension as a percentage 
of final salary or average of salaries. 
When estimating lifetime earnings in order to forecast benefits, it is assumed that 
contributors will maintain the same level of contributions as in the last year until they retire. 
There are at least two problems involved with this:  
• It looks like workers obtain no significant increase in benefit for working an extra 
year, as if the right to receive the estimated benefit were totally acquired when in 
fact this is not the case and many people still have to complete a very long working 
lifetime. 
• The hypothesis about maintaining the same level of contributions is quite extreme 
and people should be warned more explicitly of the consequences should this not 
be the case.   
The way the SSS deals with the uncertainty surrounding benefit payment is limited 
in a number of aspects. Contributors should in theory consider two different types of 
uncertainty: uncertainty about laws that may be applied in the future due to imbalances that 
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show up in the actuarial balance6
• The same importance is given to the uncertainty about legislation regardless of 
whether the individual is young or old. If cuts need to be made, then it is likely that 
they will be greater in the case of a young person than of an older person. 
However, as the same warning is given in both cases, this could be seen as being 
either too alarmist or too reassuring depending on the age group of the participant. 
, and uncertainty about the likelihood of any particular 
individual receiving the benefits described:  
• Another source of uncertainty lies in the possibility that the contributor may not 
live long enough to receive retirement pension, or not receive all the provisions that 
may have been planned for certain years. Neither is it clear what assumptions 
contributors make about their own mortality. If an affiliate uses demographic 
predictions to gauge his life expectancy from a particular age close to retirement, 
age 65 for example, he can expect a reasonable number of years in which to receive 
the benefit. However, this life expectancy is conditional upon reaching age 65, and 
the risk of mortality in the period between making the calculation and reaching that 
age may not be insignificant. 
• Another important question concerns the likelihood that participants may have the 
other two types of benefit described in the SSS: disability benefit and survivor 
benefit. Unlike retirement pension, these other benefits provide cover for unlikely 
events. The current SSS provides no information as to the likelihood of these 
events happening or the likelihood of these benefits being needed by contributors.  
 Finally, as already pointed out, some of the assumptions made when calculating 
future retirement pension tend to overestimate it, given that the chances that the 
contributor will stop paying for contributions in any future period are not considered. 
3.2.-The Orange Envelope in Sweden 
The orange envelope was first used in 1999 when a series of reforms was carried 
out on the Swedish pension system, and it is the fundamental tool for communicating with 
affiliates. The reform of the Swedish pension system was far-reaching and significantly 
strengthened the actuarial link between benefits and contributions by establishing a mixed 
NDC/capitalization system7
Every year the Swedish SSA sends out a 5 page
. With this reform the importance that the increase in life 
expectancy has on the system's financial stability is recognized and certain mechanisms 
have been designed to adjust benefits as a response to changes in longevity and other 
variables Affiliates have more responsibility when planning their pensions as this is a 
defined contribution system and, unlike in a defined benefit system, it is the contributor 
that has to take on explicit risk.  
8
                                                 
6 See BOT (2010). 
 notification concerning the value 
of consolidated rights of retirement, the orange envelope. This notification informs people 
of the balance in their notional and capitalization accounts along with any movements 
during the year, plus in most cases an estimate of the amount of future pension. It also 
explains how the new pension system works and warns affiliates that the estimated benefits 
7 The retirement contingency of the Swedish pension system is mixed. 86.49% of contributions are allocated 
to the notional defined contribution pay-as-you-go system, rate of contribution16%, while the other 13.51% 
goes to the defined contribution capitalization system, rate of contribution 2.5%. Total rate of contribution 
for the contingency of retirement is 18.5%. See Försäkringskassan (2010). 
8 It is actually 6 pages, but the last page explains how contributors can request a reconsideration of the 
decision. 
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are determined by the contributions they make in the course of their entire working 
lifetime.  
The first page shows the contributions made to the two accounts over the period. 
These contributions are based on earnings over the last year obtained from each 
individual's income tax return, i.e. they are paid not on taxable earnings for the current year 
but on those of the previous year. Details are given of the amounts saved so far towards 
the retirement pension, i.e. the value of the consolidated right for each of the two accounts. 
Finally an estimate of what the contributor will receive as a monthly retirement pension 
before tax at age 65 is given, and he is informed that if he postpones his retirement beyond 
that age, this could mean up to 10% more benefit for each year postponed. 
The second page gives information about the contributions (or pension credits) 
assigned to each of the two accounts, the taxable earnings used to calculate these 
contributions, the contribution rates for each of the two accounts, whether there are 
additional credits for special situations (e.g. military service, child years, unemployment), 
and maximum pensionable income for the year. 
The third page shows the movements determining the value of the consolidated 
rights at 31-12-2010, based on the value assigned at 31-12-2009, for each of the accounts in 
2011. The statement includes the pension credits assigned, the redistribution of the 
notional accounts of deceased contributors of the same generation (known technically as 
the survivor dividend), the explicit administration costs, the notional rate of return for the 
NDC account and the financial return for the capitalization account, which is expressed by 
“change in value”  
The fourth page lists the composition of the capitalization account portfolio assigned 
to the contributor, giving full details of the administration costs and return achieved on 
each type of fund and comparing them with the average pension saver. 
Finally the fifth page gives an estimate of what the contributor will receive as a 
monthly pension before tax for the different retirement ages of 61, 65 and 70. The 
assumption that salaries and prices remain unchanged means the pension estimates can be 
compared against the current salary or pensionable earnings. The message is conveyed that 
benefit can vary in line with economic growth and retirement age, but given that the 
forecasts are static, they do not take into account the uncertainty that exists.   
Criticism and limitations of the Orange Envelope 
The first serious limitation is that the way the estimated pension is calculated tends 
to overvalue the pension that contributors are informed about in a number of ways: 
1.-It is assumed that the individual will continue making contributions continuously until 
retirement age, which is an over-restrictive and probably unreal hypothesis for many 
younger contributors. 
2.-The rate of return considered for the capitalization account is unrelated to what the 
system has actually achieved up to now. It would be more realistic to use a rate of return 
based on experience for the forecast. 
3.-It is not specified whether the pension deriving from the capitalization account can be 
paid out in the form of a life annuity with contingent survivor benefit or not, or as 
programmed withdrawal, or that the pension deriving from the NDC account can decrease 
in real terms if the growth in average salaries is lower than predicted or the ABM is 
activated. 
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The second serious limitation is that there is no explicit information about the risk 
the contributor takes on in either the NDC or the capitalization system. As mentioned 
earlier, the contributor takes on a risk in the NDC system in that he cannot be sure what 
the internal rate of return (IRR) on his contributions will be, or the replacement rate 
achieved or the amount of the pension. Similarly in the capitalization account there is a 
financial risk dependent on the investment strategy, the annual performance of which so 
far has varied greatly, Försäkringskassan (2010). 
A third point is the misleading message conveyed as to the virtues of the 
capitalization system in so far as the return on the capitalization account considered for the 
forecast is 3.5% higher than the return on the notional account9. The contributor may be 
led to believe that there is an implicit cost in notional accounts equivalent to the difference 
in return, although if the contributor's degree of risk aversion were taken into account or if 
the return were adjusted for risk, the return differential could actually be negative10
4.- Final comments and recommendations for the case of Spain 
. In the 
example in the statement, the sum of 2,900 SEK, which out of the total monthly pension 
comes from the capitalization account, corresponds to 22.83% of the final pension of 
12,700 SEK per month, so its weight is almost twice what it should be if the returns were 
equal. The state is giving out the message that the capitalization account is better, but it 
does not take the risk into account.   
 Sending out information about public pensions to the contributor is a recent process, 
usually associated with pension system reform. It also tends to be linked to the actuarial 
balance of the system as a whole or to other solvency or sustainability indicators. 
According to Vidal-Meliá et al (2010), this is something that helps increase the pension 
system's transparency and depoliticize its management by minimizing so-called populism in 
pensions.  
 The aims of these statements are perfectly clear: to encourage contributors and 
pensioners to take more interest in the pension system; to help people with basic planning 
for retirement in those systems in which responsibility is in the hands of the contributors 
and new variables such as life expectancy, retirement age and financial or notional return 
have an effect on the amount of pension; to make contributors aware of the real level of 
cover as regards risks such as disability and death; and to check whether the contributor's 
details held by the SSAs are correct, especially as regards contributions. 
 It must be admitted that despite the advances made by introducing this type of 
reform, a number of limitations can be detected, and this leads one to think that there is 
still a long way to go before the content of the statements is satisfactory. It should be 
pointed out that in most countries the benefit forecast is overestimated, basically due to the 
hypotheses and assumptions applied, and this could be counterproductive in many cases. 
Neither is the aspect of risk dealt with satisfactorily. Indeed in some cases the information 
given in the statement could lead the contributor to believe that he is not exposed to any 
risk at all. 
                                                 
9 According to Försäkringskassan (2010), this margin has not been achieved during the period 1995-2009.  
10 According to Vidal-Meliá et al (2010), for the period 1995-2007 the risk-adjusted return for the 
Inkomstpension system was 2.81% and barely 0.41% for the premium pension system. Unfortunately the 
Swedish Pensions Agency has not published the data necessary to update the calculation of the risk-adjusted 
return up to 2009. 
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 As far as Spain is concerned, the pension reform of 2011, which was unexpected by 
most contributors11
1.- It needs to get the message across that having a social security system is important and 
worthwhile; that the system is important not only for the retirement contingency but also 
for other things - it covers disability and can provide benefits to the family in case of the 
contributor's death. The public social security system is a collective asset that should be run 
according to principles of transparency, fairness and solvency in order not to frustrate the 
expectations of contributors and pensioners.  
, significantly alters a great many contributors' pension expectations as 
it changes the essential parameters of the system and introduces a financial adjustment 
mechanism based on the evolution of life expectancy. This provides even more justification 
for considering the introduction of this type of statement. Our recommendations for its 
design after analysing the experiences of other countries are: 
2.- It needs to make the contributor understand that his benefits are conditional on two 
aspects: the individual, deriving from his own actions, i.e. the amount of contributions 
made, the length of time contributed, retirement age, etc., and the collective, i.e. the 
capacity of the system to meet the obligations acquired with contributors and pensioners, 
because any financial and/or solvency problems in the system can also affect the amount 
of benefit. This would be the main link between general information - an actuarial balance 
for the system would also have to be introduced in Spain - and individual information. The 
individual statements would therefore have to be linked to information about the system's 
sustainability. This could be done by showing some kind of solvency indicator for the 
system in the statement. This aspect is much more important than it may first appear 
because if the solvency or sustainability indicators deriving from the overall information 
show a dubious financial position, the contributors will receive clear signals that they will 
have to increase their contributions either in quantity or over time and/or the provisions 
will need to be decreased in order to maintain the system's sustainability. If the 
contributors are able to absorb the message conveyed via the individual information, they 
will be much more likely to accept the necessary reforms willingly. 
3.- Like in Canada and the USA and in conjunction with the first recommendation, it needs 
to give information about the contributor's estimated entitlement to retirement, disability 
and survivor  benefits. 
a) In order to avoid overestimating the benefits, especially as regards the retirement of 
younger contributors, more realistic hypotheses than those normally established would 
need to be used, or at least a brief sensitivity analysis should be shown.  
b) To prevent the contributor from getting the impression that his benefit will not improve 
if he contributes for an extra year, Jackson (2005), it would be a good idea to distinguish 
the amount accrued, and by comparing this year by year with the forecast pension it would 
lessen the feeling of pointlessness and strengthen the idea of saving. 
c) In order to make it easier for the contributor to calculate the replacement rate, the 
amounts should be given per annum, thereby clarifying the relationship to the final salary 
or average of salaries, which are normally shown in annual terms.  
                                                 
11 It can be considered unexpected because, according to official information in the MTIN (2008) issued in 
October 2008, it was forecast that the Spanish public pension system would have no financial difficulties until 
at least 2029, when in fact the system already had a current treasury deficit in 2010. In Spain there has always 
been a difference between what the politicians say and what the experts say, as Boado-Penas et al (2011) 
point out. The government authorities had systematically denied that the pension system had sustainability 
problems, a situation which was not helped by the absence of an official actuarial balance.  
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d) In order to improve how the contributor perceives the possibility of the events covered 
by social security actually happening, he would need to be informed about the likelihood of 
reaching a particular age (normal retirement age), the likelihood of becoming disabled and 
the likelihood of dying. Many contributors are “convinced” that certain events will never 
happen to them, and so there are certain provisions they do not consider worthwhile. 
4.- As is already the case in some countries, the statement should discriminate according to 
age rather than have a one-size-fits-all format. Younger contributors, whose retirement 
pension forecast incorporates a very high level of uncertainty, should be specifically 
informed of this. The self-employed, who can decide the amount of their pensionable 
earnings, should be made aware of exactly what this means as regards possible disability 
and/or death. The estimated retirement pension for older contributors should clearly show 
the benefits of postponing retirement and the disadvantages of retiring early, assuming the 
law allows this. Informative meetings could even be held for groups of older contributors 
interested in this problem area. 
5.- Risk should be dealt with in a personalized way via the SSA website, with this possibility 
being referred to in the actual statement. The basic factors that can reduce a contributor's 
estimated pension in a defined benefit system are that the real contribution bases may be 
lower than those forecast for a variety of reasons, there may be gaps in contributions due 
to long-term unemployment, or the system may undergo a reform that could affect 
expectations, just as happened unexpectedly in Spain in 2011.  
6.- The actual design of the statement is also important. In general terms the design should 
be attractive and dynamic, it should be associated with a particular colour, the language 
should be transparent, simple and accessible and at the same time accurate and concise, and 
it should have a maximum recommended length of between 4 and 5 pages.  
7.- Finally, in a second phase in which insurance companies, pension plan managers and 
friendly societies would work together with the SSA, the individual information on 
pensions in the public system could be joined by information on the various instruments 
that complement public provisions, in a similar way to what happens in Sweden. This 
would enable the contributor to have a complete idea as to his level of risk cover. In order 
for the contributor to become better informed as to how and why he should save and 
provide himself with better cover in the face of certain risks, a public website should be set 
up in collaboration with these companies. It would be designed to show citizens basic 
questions about how to manage their personal finances, stressing the message that 
systematic financial savings at the start of working life are the most worthwhile, as pointed 
out in the statement in Chile, because the effect of time on financial capitalization is 
exponential when it comes to accumulating capital. This would be also be advantageous for 
the companies as a way of advertising their products, and for that reason it would not be 
difficult to obtain their collaboration. It would also be a way of integrating public and 
private social protection, as Merton et al. (1987) point out.   
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Appendix 1.- Example of the US model 
 
http://www.ssa.gov/mystatement/currentstatement.pdf 
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Appendix 2.- Example of the Orange Envelope, Sweden 
 
http://www.pensionsmyndigheten.se/download/18.751693cb12c7dc5ab9580006189
/%C3%85B11+standard+engelska.pdf 
